Europe views US with ‘much less horror’ after Trump’s midterms defeat 

During the campaign for the midterm elections in the United States, neither the Democrats nor the Republicans spoke much about issues related to Europe.

US President Donald Trump’s handling of the Ukraine war, his approach to Greenland and his aggressive posture towards the European Union were not on the agenda.

Yet while the Democratic Party’s victory last week could produce a Congress that is friendlier towards Europe, experts do not expect major shifts in US foreign policy in some areas.

“Europeans are looking much less in horror towards the US than they have in the past two years, but they should not exaggerate the significance in terms of transatlantic relations,” said Erik Jones, director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute. “The trend line has been moving in a consistent direction across administrations, and this midterm election does not change that trend.”

For decades, the transatlantic relationship was built on the assumption that Washington needed a free, prosperous and secure Europe, while European governments relied on American security guarantees.

But that consensus has gradually eroded, and it did not start with Trump. Over time, there was a loss of popular support for global engagement on both sides of the Atlantic.

The pattern began under Barack Obama, whose administration started a strategic reorientation towards Asia, analysts say, because of perceived threats to US security from the region. That has become a rare area of agreement across the political divide: Republicans and Democrats alike support Europeans taking greater responsibility for their own security.

The US president has accelerated that shift with his America First approach. He has repeatedly lashed out at NATO, threatened to seize Greenland and has shown greater respect for Russia than Ukraine, undermining European efforts to isolate and weaken Moscow.

Still, tone matters.

A Democratic-controlled Congress will have more power over federal spending, legislation and congressional oversight to challenge some of Trump’s decisions. But the president would retain considerable authority over foreign policy.

“All speak in favour of better transatlantic ties, more predictable and more open to take into account European expectations from America,” said Fredrik Erixon, an economist and director of the European Centre for International Political Economy, noting that the Democrats lack a veto-proof majority. “But on issues such as Ukraine, Iran and tariffs there is still a lot of space for the president to behave in the same fashion as in past years.”

With the Iran war, which has pushed up global energy prices, there is no easy way out.

Trump could either cut a deal and declare victory, potentially leaving Iran with leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, or resume military action – a deeply unpopular prospect among US voters. In either scenario, European allies are left with a cost of living crisis that is driving protests across the continent.

Some Democrats have discussed using the next government funding bill to block flows for the war in Iran, a proposal that is popular with antiwar lawmakers.

In Ukraine, the new Democrat-dominated Congress may favour greater support for Kyiv, but that support may not be a game changer for the war-torn nation. Ukrainian officials are anxious about the two-month window before the new Congress takes office in January and fear that Trump could use the period to pursue further talks with Putin.

Even so, the Democrats are likely to invest more energy in improving social services and economic conditions at home.

Some experts also suggest that a politically weakened Trump may now look abroad to demonstrate strength, score wins and build his legacy. His domestic electoral setback could therefore translate into an even less predictable and less accommodating foreign policy.

Last week, the US president said there would soon be a “big, beautiful agreement” on Ukraine, one that “might involve all of Europe”. The comments came ahead of trilateral talks between Ukrainian, Russian and US officials in Abu Dhabi, which have so far failed to yield any breakthrough.

The prospect of a broader deal has raised questions about how much say European governments would have in negotiations that affect their security.

“Trump’s moves are difficult to predict,” said Michele Valensise, president of the Institute for International Affairs and former secretary-general of Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “It is important for Europeans to be involved in the ongoing contacts aimed at ending the war launched by Russia against Ukraine.”

“We shall see whether the American administration will now accommodate this strong European expectation or choose to ignore it, opting to negotiate exclusively with Russia – a scenario that would unfairly weaken the position of the European allies.”

That uncertainty extends beyond Ukraine.

The Pentagon is expected to complete its review of US military forces in Europe next month, potentially paving the way for decisions on the size and distribution of its footprint.

On tariffs, too, the political divide has shifted.

Democrats have traditionally been more protective of US manufacturing and workers, while Republicans were historically more closely associated with free trade. Trump’s first administration blurred that distinction, and Democrats have since moved towards a more protectionist position on trade.

But even if US courts strike down some of Trump’s tariffs, Europe may see little immediate relief. The trade agreement negotiated between Washington and Brussels is a different matter, Erixon said, because it involves the commitments made by both sides rather than tariffs imposed unilaterally by the US.

“That needs to be renegotiated for tariffs to be taken off, and the US administration will not initiate such a process in the next two years,” he said.

For Jones, the question is not whether the Democrats’ victory will improve relations with Europe, but what Europeans will do with the time it has given them.

“This is better, but how much better? And what should Europe do with the time that this election has bought them?” he said. “Should they use it to repair transatlantic relations? That would be time wasted. They should use this time to prepare for when the US will care even less.”